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IDENTIFICATION OF TREATMENT EFFECTS WITH MISMEASURED
IMPERFECT INSTRUMENTS
DE´SIRE´ KE´DAGNI
Iowa State University - Department of Economics
Abstract. In this article, I develop a novel identification result for estimating the effect of
an endogenous treatment using a proxy of an unobserved imperfect instrument. I show that
the potential outcomes distributions are partially identified for the compliers. Therefore,
I derive sharp bounds on the local average treatment effect. I write the identified set in
the form of conditional moments inequalities, which can be implemented using existing
inferential methods. I illustrate my methodology on the National Longitudinal Survey of
Youth 1979 to evaluate the returns to college attendance using tuition as a proxy of the
true cost of going to college. I find that the average return to college attendance for people
who attend college only because the cost is low is between 29% and 78%.
Keywords: Potential outcome, unobserved invalid instruments, LATE, proxy, mixture models.
JEL subject classification: C14, C21, C25, C26.
1. Introduction
Ability and cost are the two main drivers of the college education decision. However,
these two variables are in general unobserved by the econometrician when estimating the
returns to college. Ability influences both wages and schooling, which makes education
endogenous. A potential instrument for college education would be its cost (which includes
the financial cost, the opportunity cost, as well as the psychological cost). However, high
ability individuals tend to go to high quality schools (signaling), which often have higher
cost. For this reason, the cost of college education would not be a valid instrument even if it
were observed by the econometrician. Because the actual costs of education are unknown,
Date: The present version is of June 3, 2019. I thank Ota´vio Bartalotti, Helle Bunzel, Alfonso Flores-Lagunes,
Christian Hansen, Marc Henry, Brent Kreider, Ismael Mourifie´, Alex Zhylyevskyy, participants at the Iowa State
econometrics workshop for helpful discussions and comments. All errors are mine. Corresponding address: 260 Heady
Hall, 518 Farm House Lane, Ames, IA, 50011, USA. Email address: dkedagni@iastate.edu.
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researchers often resort to proxy variables such as tuition fees, distance to college, local
unemployment rate, local average earnings, etc, to instrument for education.
This paper proposes an identification result for estimating the returns to college when an
unobserved imperfect instrument like cost is replaced by its proxy (e.g., tuition). I show that
the local average treatment effect defined based on the unobserved imperfect instrument
is partially identified under some mild assumptions. Moreover, I partially identify the
potential outcome distributions for the compliers (e.g., people who go to college only because
the cost is low).
The intuition behind my identification result is the following. The treatment variable
college attendance and the unobserved binary cost variable1 partition the population into
four unobserved groups, commonly referred to as types: the always-takers, individuals who
attend college regardless of the cost level; the never-takers, people who will not attend college
regardless of the cost level; the compliers, those who attend college only because the cost
is low; and the defiers, individuals who attend college only because the cost is high (which
I assume away in the population for convenience). Under my identifying assumptions, the
identified distribution of the observed outcome variable conditional on the treatment and
the proxy is a mixture of the potential outcome distributions for the compliers and the
always-takers or never-takers, where mixture weights depend on the proxy variable while
the mixture components do not. Therefore, I use variations in the proxy variable to derive
sharp bounds on the mixture components, which are the distributions of interest.
I write the identified set in the form of conditional moment inequalities, which is more
conducive to inference. I apply my methodology on the National Longitudinal Survey of
Youth 1979 (NLSY79) data and find that the average return to college attendance for
individuals who attend college only because the cost is low is between 29% and 78%.
Related literature. Chalak (2017) discusses the interpretation of various estimands (Wald,
Instrumental variable: IV, local instrumental variable: LIV) when the true instrument is
valid, but mismeasured. In the current paper, the true instrument is invalid and mismea-
sured. This means that the estimands above will not have any clear causal interpretations.
Ke´dagni (2018) studies identification of treatment effects when the true instrument is ob-
served, but is invalid. He relies on the existence of a proxy of the true instrument to do
1The true cost of going to college may be continuous. However, I assume that the individuals make
the schooling decision based on their ability and whether the cost is low or high. Each agent has its own
subjective threshold above which she judges the cost high.
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identification. This use of a proxy variable for identification purposes is not new in the
literature, see Lubotsky and Wittenberg (2006) and references therein. However, using a
proxy of an invalid unobserved instrumental variable to identify heterogeneous treatment
effects appears novel.
This paper relates to the work by Ura (2018), Lewbel (2007), Mahajan (2006), Kreider
et al. (2012) among others, as it allows for measurement errors in a variable. However,
here the measurement error is in the instrumental variable while the papers above allow for
measurement errors in the treatment variable. Like in Ura (2018), the measurement error
is nonclassical (i.e., it can depend on the true instrument) and differential (i.e., it can be
dependent on the outcome conditional on the true instrument). The paper uses results on
identification of finite mixture models by Henry, Kitamura, and Salanie´ (2014) to partially
identify parameters of interest. Even though, I derive bounds on the potential outcome
distributions for the compliers, I focus on the local average treatment effect introduced
by Imbens and Angrist (1994) and Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin (1996) in the empirical
illustration. This article also relates to Card (2001) as it proposes a way to do identification
with an invalid instrument like cost, an issue raised by the author.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and
the identifying assumptions. In Section 3, we provide the identification results. Section 4
shows some empirical evidence and Section 5 concludes. The proofs are presented in the
appendix.
2. Analytical Framework
Consider the following IV model{
Y = αD + U
D = δZ + V
(2.1)
where the vector (Y,D,Z) is the observed data, Y ∈ Y ⊂ R, D and Z are binary, and
(α,U, δ, V ) is a vector of latent variables. Since D and Z are binary, for the model to be
well-specified, we must have V ∈ {0, 1} and δ ∈ {−1, 0, 1}. Indeed, the support of (δ, V )
is {(0,1),(1,0),(0,0),(-1,1)}2. The standard LATE assumptions introduced by Imbens and
Angrist (1994) are:
2To see this, suppose Y = g(D, U˜) and D = h(Z, V˜ ). Since D and Z are binary, we can rewrite
Y = αD + U and D = δZ + V , where α = [g(1, U˜) − g(0, U˜)], U = g(0, U˜), δ = [h(1, V˜ ) − h(0, V˜ )],
V = h(0, V˜ ), and h(z, V˜ ) ∈ {0, 1} for all z ∈ {0, 1}.
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• Z |= (α,U, δ, V ) (full independence);
• δ ≥ 0, i.e., δ ∈ {0, 1} (monotonicity);
• E[δ] 6= 0 (non-zero effect of Z on D).
Under these assumptions, LATE ≡ E[α|δ = 1] is identified as
αIV ≡ Cov(Y,Z)
Cov(D,Z)
=
E[Y |Z = 1]− E[Y |Z = 0]
E[D|Z = 1]− E[D|Z = 0] .
First, I relax full independence Z |= (α,U, δ, V ) to conditional independence Z |= (α,U)|(δ, V ).
The intuition is that if (δ, V ) were independent of (α,U), there would be no endogene-
ity issue in the model as long as Z is exogenous. In such a case, E[α] is identified by
E[Y |D = 1]−E[Y |D = 0]. Therefore, controlling for (δ, V ) would help deal with endogene-
ity in the model.
Suppose now that the econometrician does not observe Z, instead she observes a proxy
W that satisfies: (Z,W ) |= (α,U) | (δ, V ). As the instrument Z, its proxy W can be
dependent on the unobserved heterogeneity (α,U, δ, V ). This assumption helps partially
identify the same LATE = E[α|δ = 1]. All results derived in the paper hold conditionally
on covariates. To ease the exposition, I drop exogenous covariates from the model.
As illustration, let D be an indicator for college education, Y be log wage, Z be an
indicator for low college cost, and W be tuition fees (or an indicator for college proximity).
High ability individuals tend to go to high quality schools (signaling), which often have
higher cost (See Table 1 for the NLSY79 data). Therefore, Z would not be independent of
(α,U, δ, V ).
Table 1. Ability and tuition
tuition OLS
ability 0.1071∗∗
(0.0538)
n 1230
Standard errors (in parentheses)
** stands for 5% significant.
We are interested in learning some characteristics of the latent variable α. Denote Y1 =
α+ U and Y0 = U . I now state my main identifying assumptions.
Assumption 1 (Selection on unobservables). The vector (Z,W ) is independent of Yd given
the unobservables (δ, V ), i.e., (Z,W ) |= Yd | (δ, V ), for both d = 0 and d = 1.
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Assumption 2 (Monotonicity). δ ≥ 0.
Assumption 1 states that the vector of the imperfect instruments (Z,W ) is independent
of the potential outcomes Yd given the first stage unobserved heterogeneity (δ, V ). It is
weaker than the assumption (Z,W ) |= (α,U) | (δ, V ) discussed above. Assumption 2 is the
standard monotonicity assumption that rules out the the element (−1, 1) from the support
of (δ, V ). It is used here for convenience. Relaxing this assumption will only increase the
dimensionality of the parameters to be identified.3
In the treatment effect literature, the unobserved heterogeneity (δ, V ) partition the pop-
ulation into four unobserved groups known as types or strata: the always-takers, the defiers,
the compliers and the never-takers. For example, in my framework, the always-takers are
Table 2. Subpopulations
Types δ V
Always-takers 0 1
Compliers 1 0
Defiers -1 1
Never-takers 0 0
people who would go to college regardless of the cost being low or high; the compliers are
individuals who attend college only because the cost is low; the never-takers are people who
will not go to college whether the cost is low or not; and the defiers are individuals who
attend college only because the cost is high.
3. Identification results
In this section, I provide a heuristic derivation of the main results in the paper. Formal
proofs are relegated to the appendix. I first write the distribution of the observed outcome
Y conditional on the treatment D = 1 and the proxy variable W = w as a mixture of
distributions of the potential outcome Y1 for the compliers group (δ = 1, V = 0) and
the always-takers group (δ = 0, V = 1), where only the mixture weights depend on w.
Therefore, I use variations in w to write the compliers and always-takers distributions of
Y1 as functions of two parameters that are partially identified. Furthermore, I show that
point-identification can be achieved under some tail conditions.
3See Appendix B for more details.
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3.1. Partial identification. For y ∈ Y, we have
P(Y ≤ y|D = 1,W = w) = P(Y1 ≤ y|D = 1,W = w),
= P(Y1 ≤ y|D = 1, δ = 1, V = 0,W = w)P(δ = 1, V = 0|D = 1,W = w)
+P(Y1 ≤ y|D = 1, δ = 0, V = 1,W = w)P(δ = 0, V = 1|D = 1,W = w),
= P(Y1 ≤ y|Z = 1, δ = 1, V = 0,W = w)P(δ = 1, V = 0|D = 1,W = w)
+P(Y1 ≤ y|D = 1, δ = 0, V = 1,W = w)P(δ = 0, V = 1|D = 1,W = w),
where the second equality follows from the law of iterated expectations (LEI) and Assump-
tion 2, and the third holds because the following equality holds: {D = 1, δ = 1, V = 0} =
{Z = 1, δ = 1, V = 0}. Using Assumption 1 and this implication {δ = 0, V = 1} =⇒ {D =
1} (the always-takers take the treatment), we have
P(Y ≤ y|D = 1,W = w) = P(Y1 ≤ y|δ = 1, V = 0)P(δ = 1, V = 0|D = 1,W = w)
+P(Y1 ≤ y|δ = 0, V = 1)P(δ = 0, V = 1|D = 1,W = w).
The identified distribution P(Y ≤ y|D = 1,W = w) is a mixture of two distributions of
interest P(Y1 ≤ y|δ = 1, V = 0) and P(Y1 ≤ y|δ = 0, V = 1) with unknown weights functions
of w. Similarly, the identified distribution P(Y ≤ y|D = 0,W = w) is a mixture of two
distributions of interest P(Y0 ≤ y|δ = 1, V = 0) and P(Y0 ≤ y|δ = 0, V = 0) with unknown
weights functions of w.
P(Y ≤ y|D = 0,W = w) = P(Y0 ≤ y|δ = 1, V = 0)P(δ = 1, V = 0|D = 0,W = w)
+P(Y0 ≤ y|δ = 0, V = 0)P(δ = 0, V = 0|D = 0,W = w).
For the sake of clarity of exposition, I use some additional notation.
Notation 1. Denote αd(w) ≡ P(δ = 1, V = 0|D = d,W = w), F (y|d,w) ≡ P(Y ≤ y|D =
d,W = w), αd(A) ≡ P(δ = 1, V = 0|D = d,W ∈ A), F (y|d,A) ≡ P(Y ≤ y|D = d,W ∈ A),
Fd(y|1, 0) ≡ P(Yd ≤ y|δ = 1, V = 0), and Fd(y|0, d) ≡ P(Yd ≤ y|δ = 0, V = d).
We have the following two-component mixture models:
F (y|d,w) = Fd(y|1, 0)αd(w) + Fd(y|0, d)(1− αd(w)), (3.1)
for each d ∈ {0, 1}. Therefore, I follow the results of Henry, Kitamura, and Salanie´ (2014)
on identification of finite mixture models to show that the distributions Fd(y|1, 0) and
Fd(y|0, d) are identified up to two scalar parameters that are partially identified. Indeed,
I show that for some subsets Ad0 and A
d
1 of W, the distributions Fd(y|0, d), Fd(y|1, 0), and
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the probability weight αd(w) can be written as functions of two parameters θd and ηd as
follows:4
Fd(y|0, d) = F (y|d,Ad0)− ηd
[
F (y|d,Ad1)− F (y|d,Ad0)
]
,
Fd(y|1, 0) = F (y|d,Ad0) +
(
θd − ηd
) [
F (y|d,Ad1)− F (y|d,Ad0)
]
, (3.2)
αd(w) =
1
θd
(
ηd + Λd(w)
)
,
where
Λd(w) =
F (yd|d,w)− F (yd|d,Ad0)
F (yd|d,Ad1)− F (yd|d,Ad0)
for some yd ∈ Y. An implicit assumption behind this result is that there exist yd, Ad0 and
Ad1 such that F (y
d|d,Ad1) 6= F (yd|d,Ad0).
Under a relevance assumption that I discuss below, if F (y|d,Ad1) = F (y|d,Ad0) for all
y, then the distributions Fd(y|1, 0) and Fd(y|0, d) are equal and point-identified. Indeed,
we have F (y|d,Ad1) − F (y|d,Ad0) = [αd(Ad1) − αd(Ad0)][Fd(y|1, 0) − Fd(0, d)]. Suppose that
αd(Ad1) 6= αd(Ad0). Then F (y|d,Ad1) = F (y|d,Ad0) implies Fd(y|1, 0) = Fd(y|0, d). By
plugging the latter equality in Equation (3.1), it follows that the distributions Fd(y|1, 0) and
Fd(y|0, d) are identified and are both equal to the distribution of the outcome conditional
on the treatment F (y|d).
Notice that I turn the problem to a parametric model, which is easier to deal with as it
reduces the dimensionality of the problem. The parameters ηd and θd are partially identified
using the monotonicity condition of a cumulative distribution function and the condition
on the probability weights as follows:
f(y|d,Ad0)− ηd
[
f(y|d,Ad1)− f(y|d,Ad0)
]
≥ 0,
f(y|d,Ad0) +
(
θd − ηd
) [
f(y|d,Ad1)− f(y|d,Ad0)
]
≥ 0, (3.3)
0 ≤ 1
θd
(
ηd + Λd(w)
)
≤ 1,
for all y and w, where f(y|d,A) denotes the density (or probability mass) function of Y
conditional on (D = d,W ∈ A).
Before I summarize the above discussion, let me state clearly one relevance assumption
that I use.
4See Appendix A.1 for more details.
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Assumption 3 (Relevance). For each d ∈ {0, 1}, there exist two subsets Ad0 and Ad1 of W
such that αd(Ad0) 6= αd(Ad1).
Proposition 1. Under Assumptions 1, 2 and 3, the following holds.
(1) If F (yd|d,Ad1) 6= F (yd|d,Ad0) for some yd ∈ Y, then the distributions Fd(y|1, 0) and
Fd(y|0, d) are partially identified as described by Equations (3.2) and (3.3). The
identification region is sharp.
(2) If F (y|d,Ad1) = F (y|d,Ad0) for all y ∈ Y, then the distributions Fd(y|1, 0) and
Fd(y|0, d) are point-identified and are both equal to the conditional distribution F (y|d).
The proposition above shows that in general, the potential outcome distributions are not
point identified, but partially identified. However, in some extreme cases, they are point
identified.
3.2. Point-identification under tail restrictions. In this subsection, I show that point-
identification of the potential outcome distributions for the compliers can be obtained under
the following assumption.
Assumption 4 (Tail restrictions (TR)). limy↓y`
F0(y|1,0)
F0(y|0,0) = 0 and limy↑yu
1−F1(y|1,0)
1−F1(y|0,1) = 0,
where y` and yu are lower and upper bounds of the support Y, repectively.
The intuition behind this assumption is the following. Think of the always-takers as
the high return individuals, the never-takers as the low return ones, and the compliers
as the marginal individuals. The conditition limy↑yu
1−F1(y|1,0)
1−F1(y|0,1) = 0 states that among
people who attended college, the high earners among the always-takers earn an order of
magnitude higher than the high earners among the compliers. Similarly, The assumption
limy↓y`
F0(y|1,0)
F0(y|0,0) = 0 means that among people who did not attend college, the low earners
among the never-takers earn an order of magnitude less than the low earners among the
compliers.
Proposition 2. Under Assumptions 1, 2, 3 and 4, the distributions F1(y|1, 0) and F0(y|1, 0)
are point-identified as follows:
F0(y|1, 0) = F (y|0, A00) + 11−ζ0(A01,A10)
[
F (y|0, A01)− F (y|0, A00)
]
,
F1(y|1, 0) = F (y|1, A10) + 11−pi1(A11,A10)
[
F (y|1, A11)− F (y|1, A10)
]
,
(3.4)
where
ζ0(A01, A
0
0) = lim
y↓y`
F (y|0, A01)
F (y|0, A00)
, and pi1(A11, A
1
0) = lim
y↑yu
1− F (y|1, A11)
1− F (y|1, A10)
.
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The result of this proposition combined with that of Proposition 1 can serve as a test
for Assumption 4. Indeed, under Assumptions 1, 2, 3 and 4, the bounds of Proposition 1
remain valid. Therefore, the point-identified distributions in Proposition 2 must lie within
those bounds. Otherwise, Assumption 4 is not compatible with the other three.
In the next section, I illustrate how the bounds of Proposition 1 can be constructed in
practice using the NLSY79 data.
4. Empirical results: Returns to college
In this section, I use the methodology developed in this paper to evaluate the returns to
college attendance using tuition fees as a proxy for the cost of going to college. As discussed
in the introduction, the cost of college education comprises the financial cost, the opportu-
nity cost, the psychological cost (cost of effort), etc. High ability students usually tend to
attend high quality schools (signaling), which often have higher attendance cost.5 For this
reason, the educational cost, even if it were observed, would not be a good instrument for
schooling as it is not independent of ability. Card (2001) warns researchers against using
variables that are related to educational institutions like tuition fees or distance to college
as instruments for schooling.
For my analysis, I use the data of Heckman, Tobias, and Vytlacil (2001). The data is a
sample of 1,230 white males taken from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979.
The outcome variable is the log weekly wage labelled “lwage”, the treatment variable “col-
lege” is the indicator of whether the individual completed at least 13 years of education or
not. The proxy variable “tuit17” is the tuition fees at age 17. The data also contains a mea-
sure of ability we use to show some evidence that tuition is correlated with ability. Notice
that Ke´dagni and Mourifie´ (2015) reject the independence assumption between potential
earnings and tuition fees.
Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics. In the data, 43% of the individuals completed
13 years of education.
I rewrite inequalities in (3.3) in the form of conditional moment inequalities, which allows
me to use existing inference methods such as those of Chernozhukov, Lee, and Rosen (2013)
and Chernozhukov et al. (2015). One could alternatively use Andrews and Shi (2013) and
Andrews, Kim, and Shi (2016). See the appendix for the details of the implementation.
5Note however that high quality schools are more likely to provide scholarships to their students, which
can compensate their high cost. But, still the attendance cost for these schools remains high.
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Table 3. Summary Statistics
Total
Observations 1,230
lwage 2.4138 (0.5937)
college 0.4325 (0.4956)
tuit17 8.5686 (4.1277)
abil 1.7966 (2.1844)
Average and standard deviation (in the parentheses)
Table 4 displays the confidence regions for different parameters. The results show that
the 95% confidence for the LATE is between is between 0.2545 and 0.5753 log points, that
is, the average return to college for individuals who attend college only because the cost is
low is between 29% and 78%. This parameter may be relevant for policies which aim at
reducing the college attendance cost, as it shows that the return is positive and substantial
for people who are sensitive to the cost. Covariates can be included in the analysis, but the
Table 4. Confidence sets for parameters
Parameters Estimates 95% conf. LB 95% conf. UB
θ1 0.1 9.1
η1 0.5 50
θ0 0.1 9.1
η0 0.5 50
E[Y1|δ = 1] 2.5185 2.6822
E[Y0|δ = 1] 2.1069 2.2640
LATE ≡ E[α|δ = 1] 0.2545 0.5753
OLS 0.4039∗∗∗ 0.3408 0.4671
(0.0322)
Standard errors (in parentheses); *** stands for 1% significant;
conf.: confidence; LB: lower bound; UB: upper bound.
size of the data is not big enough to allow me to do so.
5. Conclusion
This paper develops a new identification result for evaluating the effect of an endogenous
treatment when the researcher observes a proxy of an imperfect instrumental variable. I
derive sharp bounds on the potential outcomes distributions for compliers and hence on
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the local average treatment effect. I show that inference on the identified set can be done
using existing results on intersection bounds. I apply my methodology on the National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 and find that the average return to college attendance
for people who attend college only because the cost is low is between 29% and 78%.
My approach requires the treatment variable and the imperfect instrument to be discrete.
The next step of this research will be the extension of the methodology to continuous
treatments and instruments. This is left for future research.
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Appendix A. Proofs
A.1. Proof of Proposition 1. Validity of the bounds: Consider the mixture model
given by Equation (3.1)
F (y|d,w) = Fd(y|1, 0)αd(w) + Fd(y|0, d)(1− αd(w)). (A.1)
We have
F (y|d,Ad1)− F (y|d,Ad0) =
[
αd(Ad1)− αd(Ad0)
][
Fd(y|1, 0)− Fd(y|0, d)
]
. (A.2)
Therefore, under Assumption 3, we can write
F (y|1, 0) = Fd(y|0, d) + 1
αd(Ad1)− αd(Ad0)
[
F (y|d,Ad1)− F (y|d,Ad0)
]
,
which together with (A.1) imply
F (y|d,Ad0) = Fd(y|0, d) +
αd(Ad0)
αd(Ad1)− αd(Ad0)
[
F (y|d,Ad1)− F (y|d,Ad0)
]
.
Hence,
Fd(y|0, d) = F (y|d,Ad0)− ηd
[
F (y|d,Ad1)− F (y|d,Ad0)
]
, (A.3)
Fd(y|1, 0) = F (y|d,Ad0) + (θd − ηd)
[
F (y|d,Ad1)− F (y|d,Ad0)
]
, (A.4)
where θd = 1
αd(Ad1)−αd(Ad0)
and ηd =
αd(Ad0)
αd(Ad1)−αd(Ad0)
. From there, it is straightforward that (2)
holds, i.e., if F (y|d,Ad1)−F (y|d,Ad0) for all y ∈ Y, then Fd(y|0, d) = Fd(y|1, 0) = F (y|d,Ad0).
Suppose now that there exists yd such that F (yd|d,Ad1)− F (yd|d,Ad0) 6= 0. Then
F (yd|d,w)− F (yd|d,Ad0)
F (yd|d,Ad1)− F (yd|d,Ad0)
=
αd(Ad1)− αd(Ad0)
αd(w)− αd(Ad0
= θdαd(w)− ηd ≡ Λd(w).
Therefore,
αd(w) =
1
θd
(
Λd(w) + ηd
)
, (A.5)
where
Λd(w) =
F (yd|d,w)− F (yd|d,Ad0)
F (yd|d,Ad1)− F (yd|d,Ad0)
.
For Equations (A.3) and (A.4) to represent cumulative distribution functions, θd and ηd
must satisfy the monotonicity condition of a distribution function, i.e.,
f(y|d,Ad0)− ηd
[
f(y|d,Ad1)− f(y|d,Ad0)
]
≥ 0, (A.6)
f(y|d,Ad0) +
(
θd − ηd
) [
f(y|d,Ad1)− f(y|d,Ad0)
]
≥ 0. (A.7)
TREATMENT EFFECTS WITH MISMEASURED IMPERFECT IVS 13
Also, for Equation (A.5) to represent a probability weight, θd and ηd must satisfy the
non-negativity condition and the condition that a probability is no greater than 1, i.e.,
0 ≤ 1
θd
(
ηd + Λd(w)
)
≤ 1. (A.8)
Thus, the bounds are valid. It remains to show that they are sharp.
Sharpness: Given the above constraints A.6, A.7 and A.8, we need to find for each
(θ0, θ1, η0, η1) a joint distribution on (Y0, Y1, δ, V, Z,W ) that generates a joint distribution
on the data (Y,D,W ) through the model (2.1) and satisfies Assumptions 1, 2 and 3. Define
Fd(y|1, 0), Fd(y|0, d)) and αd(w) as in (A.3), (A.4) and (A.5), respectively. I propose the
following conditional distribution for (δ, V, Z) given W = w
P(δ = 1, V = 0, Z = 1|w) ≡ α1(w)P(D = 1|W = w),
P(δ = 1, V = 0, Z = 0|w) ≡ α0(w)P(D = 0|W = w),
P(δ = 0, V = 1, Z = 0|w) ≡ 0.25(1− α1(w))P(D = 1|W = w),
P(δ = 0, V = 1, Z = 1|w) ≡ 0.75(1− α1(w))P(D = 1|W = w),
P(δ = 0, V = 0, Z = 1|w) ≡ 0.25(1− α0(w))P(D = 0|W = w),
P(δ = 0, V = 0, Z = 0|w) ≡ 0.75(1− α0(w))P(D = 0|W = w),
and the following joint distribution for (Y0, Y1, δ, V, Z) conditional on W = w
P(Y0 ≤ y0, Y1 ≤ y1, δ = 1, V = 0, Z = z|w) ≡ F0(y0|1, 0)F1(y1|1, 0)P(δ = 1, V = 0, Z = z|w),
P(Y0 ≤ y0, Y1 ≤ y1, δ = 0, V = 1, Z = z|w) ≡ F0(y0|0, 1)F1(y1|0, 1)P(δ = 0, V = 1, Z = z|w),
P(Y0 ≤ y0, Y1 ≤ y1, δ = 0, V = 0, Z = z|w) ≡ F0(y0|0, 0)F1(y1|0, 0)P(δ = 0, V = 0, Z = z|w).
Assumption 2 holds by construction. We can check that Assumption 1 holds. For instance,
P(Y1 ≤ y1|δ = 1, V = 0, Z = z,W = w) = P(Y1 ≤ y1, δ = 1, V = 0, Z = z|W = w)P(δ = 1, V = 0, Z = z|W = w) ,
=
limy0↑∞ P(Y0 ≤ y0, Y1 ≤ y1, δ = 1, V = 0, Z = z|W = w)
P(δ = 1, V = 0, Z = z|W = w) ,
=
F1(y1|δ = 1, V = 0)P(δ = 1, V = 0, Z = z|w)
P(δ = 1, V = 0, Z = z|w) ,
= F1(y1|δ = 1, V = 0).
The reasoning is similar for all other cases. This completes the proof.
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A.2. Inference. Consider the following conditions that θd and ηd need to satisfy:
f(y|d,Ad0)− ηd
[
f(y|d,Ad1)− f(y|d,Ad0)
]
≥ 0, (A.9)
f(y|d,Ad0) +
(
θd − ηd
) [
f(y|d,Ad1)− f(y|d,Ad0)
]
≥ 0, (A.10)
0 ≤ 1
θd
(
ηd + Λd(w)
)
≤ 1. (A.11)
By Bayes’ rule, we have
f(y|d,Ad` ) =
P(D = d,W ∈ Ad` |Y = y)f(y)
P(D = d,W ∈ Ad` )
, ` ∈ {0, 1},
where f(y) is the probability density function of Y . Thus, for all y such that f(y) > 0, we
can rewrite the first two inequalities (A.9) and (A.10) as
P(D = d,W ∈ Ad0|Y = y)
P(D = d,W ∈ Ad0)
−ηd
[P(D = d,W ∈ Ad1|Y = y)
P(D = d,W ∈ Ad1)
− P(D = d,W ∈ A
d
0|Y = y)
P(D = d,W ∈ Ad0)
]
≥ 0,
P(D = d,W ∈ Ad0|Y = y)
P(D = d,W ∈ Ad0)
+(θd−ηd)
[P(D = d,W ∈ Ad1|Y = y)
P(D = d,W ∈ Ad1)
−P(D = d,W ∈ A
d
0|Y = y)
P(D = d,W ∈ Ad0)
]
≥ 0,
which are respectively equivalent to
E
[
1{D = d,W ∈ Ad0}c1 − ηd(1{D = d,W ∈ Ad1}c0 − 1{D = d,W ∈ Ad0}c1)|Y = y
]
≥ 0,
E
[
1{D = d,W ∈ Ad0}c1+(θd−ηd)(1{D = d,W ∈ Ad1}c0−1{D = d,W ∈ Ad0}c1)|Y = y
]
≥ 0,
where c0 = P(D = d,W ∈ Ad0) and c1 = P(D = d,W ∈ Ad1).
By multiplying the last condition (A.11) by θdsign(θd), it can be written as{
sign(θd)
(
ηd + Λd(w)
) ≥ 0
sign(θd)
(
θd − ηd − Λd(w)) ≥ 0
where sign(θd) = 1{θd > 0} − 1{θd < 0}, which can equivalently be rewritten as
E
[
sign(θd)
(
ηd + 1{Y ≤ yd}k1 − k2|D = d,W = w
) ] ≥ 0
E
[
sign(θd)
(
θd − ηd − 1{Y ≤ yd}k1 + k2|D = d,W = w
) ] ≥ 0
where k1 =
1
F (yd|d,Ad1)−F (yd|d,Ad0)
, and k2 =
F (yd|d,Ad0)
F (yd|d,Ad1)−F (yd|d,Ad0)
.
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To summarize, we have the following conditional moment inequalities:
E
[
1{D = d,W ∈ Ad0}c1 − ηd(1{D = d,W ∈ Ad1}c0 − 1{D = d,W ∈ Ad0}c1)|Y = y
]
≥ 0,
E
[
1{D = d,W ∈ Ad0}c1 + (θd − ηd)(1{D = d,W ∈ Ad1}c0 − 1{D = d,W ∈ Ad0}c1)|Y = y
]
≥ 0,
E
[
sign(θd)
(
ηd + 1{Y ≤ yd}k1 − k2|D = d,W = w
) ]
≥ 0
E
[
sign(θd)
(
θd − ηd − 1{Y ≤ yd}k1 + k2|D = d,W = w
) ]
≥ 0.
Implementation. In my empirical illustration, Y=lwage, D=college, W=tuit17, and Z=indicator
of low cost (unobserved). I use the clrbound command of Chernozhukov et al. (2015) with
the local linear method. I set Ad1 = 1{W ≤ F−1W (0.5)} and Ad0 = 1{W > F−1W (0.5)} for each
d = 0 and d = 1, where F−1W (α) is the α-th quantile of W . I replace c0, c1, k1, k2 by their
sample analogs. Mourifie´ and Wan (2017) showed the validity of this plug-in approach in
the intersection bounds context. Let
m(D,W ; θd, ηd|1, 0) = 1{D = d,W ∈ Ad0}c1−ηd(1{D = d,W ∈ Ad1}c0−1{D = d,W ∈ Ad0}c1.
I do a grid search of (θd, ηd) over [−M,M ] × [−L,L], where M and L are arbitrarily
large. After applying the clrbound command on the inequalities above, I keep the values
of (θd, ηd) for which the test is not rejected. For each such (θd, ηd), I obtain the estimate
mˆ(y; θd, ηd|1, 0) of E[m(D,W ; θd, ηd|1, 0)|Y = y], its standard error sˆ(y; θd, ηd|1, 0) and the
critical value k0.95. From there, I get the estimate of the density fd(y; θ
d, ηd|1, 0):
fˆ0.95d (y; θ
d, ηd|1, 0) =
[
mˆ(y; θd, ηd|1, 0) + k0.95sˆ(y; θd, ηd|1, 0)
]
fˆ(y),
where fˆ(y) = 1nh
∑n
i=1K(
y−Yi
h ), K(u) =
3
4
√
5
(1−15u2)1
{|u| ≤ √5}, h = n−1/5 [0.9 min(σY , Q3−Q11.349 )],
σY , Q1, Q3 are empirical standard deviation, first and third quartiles of Y , respectively.
A.3. Proof of Proposition 2. I adapt the proof in Ke´dagni (2018) to the current setting.
Proof. Under Assumption 1, Equation (A.1) holds and we have for d = 1,
1− F (y|1, w) = α1(w) [1− F1(y|1, 0)] + (1− α1(w)) [1− F1(y|0, 1)] .
Under Assumption 3, at least one of the weights α1(A11) and α
1(A10) is different from 1.
Assume without loss of generality that α1(A10) 6= 1. Then
lim
y↑yu
1− F (y|1, A11)
1− F (y|1, A10)
= lim
y↑yu
α1(A11)
1−F1(y|1,0)
1−F1(y|0,1) + 1− α1(A11)
α1(A10)
1−F1(y|1,0)
1−F1(y|0,1) + 1− α1(A10)
=
1− α1(A11)
1− α1(A10)
≡ pi1(A11, A10),
where the second equality holds under Assumption 4.
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Under Assumption 3, we have 1
1−pi1(A11,A10)
=
1−α1(A10)
α1(A11)−α1(A10)
. Then
1
1−pi1(A11,A10)
[
F (y|1, A11)− F (y|1, A10)
]
=
α1(A11)−α1(A10)
1−pi1(A11,A10)
[F1(y|1, 0)− F1(y|0, 1)] ,
= (1− α1(A10)) [F1(y|1, 0)− F1(y|0, 1)] ,
= F1(y|1, 0)− F (y|1, A10),
where the first equality follows from Equation (A.2), the second from the above equality,
and the last holds from (A.1). Thus,
F1(y|1, 0) = F (y|1, A10) +
1
1− pi1(A11, A10)
[
F (y|1, A11)− F (y|1, A10)
]
.
The reasoning is similar for F0(y|1, 0). This completes the proof. 
Appendix B. Relaxing Monotonicity
Under Assumption 1, we can write the identified distribution F (y|1, w) as a mixture of
the potential outcome distributions of Y1 for the compliers, the defiers and the always-takers
as follows:
F (y|1, w) = λ11(w)F1(y|1, 0) + λ12(w)F1(y| − 1, 1) + (1− λ11(w)− λ12(w))F1(y|0, 1). (B.1)
Similarly, we have
F (y|0, w) = λ01(w)F0(y|1, 0) + λ02(w)F0(y| − 1, 1) + (1− λ01(w)− λ02(w))F0(y|0, 1). (B.2)
Following the results of Henry, Kitamura, and Salanie´ (2014) on finite mixture models, we
can show under some relevance condition that the potential outcome distributions of Y1
and Y0 are partially identified for the compliers and the defiers, respectively. We can show
that each of these distributions is function of six parameters that are partially identified.
From there, we can obtain bounds on the local average / quantile treatment effects for the
compliers and the defiers. To the best of my knowledge, this result is new in the literature.
Below, I derive the results for Equation (B.1). Results for Equation (B.2) can be obtained
in a similar way. Equation (B.1) implies
F (y|1, w)− F (y|1, A10) = [λ11(w)− λ11(A10)][F1(y|1, 0)− F1(y|0, 1)]
+[λ12(w)− λ12(A10)][F1(y| − 1, 1)− F1(y|0, 1)],
= ψ(w)tm(y),
TREATMENT EFFECTS WITH MISMEASURED IMPERFECT IVS 17
where
ψ(w) ≡
[
λ11(w)− λ11(A10)
λ12(w)− λ12(A10)
]
, and m(y) ≡
[
F1(y|1, 0)− F1(y|0, 1)
F1(y| − 1, 1)− F1(y|0, 1)
]
.
Assumption 5. There exist three subsets A10, A
1
1, A
1
2 ⊂ W such that the matrix
Ψ ≡
[
λ11(A
1
1)− λ11(A10) λ11(A12)− λ11(A10)
λ12(A
1
1)− λ12(A10) λ12(A12)− λ12(A10)
]
is invertible, i.e., the determinant |Ψ| = [λ11(A11)− λ11(A10)] ∗ [λ12(A12)− λ12(A10)]− [λ11(A12)−
λ11(A
1
0)] ∗ [λ12(A11)− λ12(A10)] 6= 0.
Denote h(y) ≡
[
F1(y|1, 0)− F1(y|0, 1)
F1(y| − 1, 1)− F1(y|0, 1)
]
. We have h(y) = Ψtm(y), which implies
under Assumption 5 that m(y) = (Ψt)−1h(y). By rewriting this last equality, we obtain:
F1(y|1, 0) = F1(y|0, 1) + γ11 [F (y|1, A11)− F (y|1, A10)]− γ13 [F (y|1, A12)− F (y|1, A10)],
F1(y| − 1, 1) = F1(y|0, 1)− γ12 [F (y|1, A11)− F (y|1, A10)] + γ14 [F (y|1, A12)− F (y|1, A10)],
where
γ11 =
λ12(A
1
2)− λ12(A10)
|Ψ| , γ
1
2 =
λ11(A
1
2)− λ11(A10)
|Ψ| ,
γ13 =
λ12(A
1
1)− λ12(A10)
|Ψ| , γ
1
4 =
λ11(A
1
1)− λ11(A10)
|Ψ| .
From Equation (B.1), we have
F (y|1, A10) = ρ11F1(y|1, 0) + ρ12F1(y| − 1, 1) + (1− ρ11 − ρ12)F1(y|0, 1), (B.3)
where ρ11 = λ
1
1(A
1
0) and ρ
1
2 = λ
1
2(A
1
0). I can therefore plug the expressions for F1(y|1, 0) and
F1(y| − 1, 1) in (B.3), and obtain
F (y|1, A10) = F1(y|1, 0) + (ρ11γ11 − ρ12γ12)[F (y|1, A11)− F (y|1, A0)]
+(ρ12γ
1
4 − ρ11γ13)[F (y|1, A11)− F (y|1, A10)].
From this last equation, we have
F1(y|1, 0) = F (y|1, A10)− (ρ11γ11 − ρ12γ12)[F (y|1, A11)− F (y|1, A0)]
−(ρ12γ14 − ρ11γ13)[F (y|1, A12)− F (y|1, A10)]. (B.4)
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Thus,
F1(y|0, 1) = F (y|1, A10) + (γ11 − ρ11γ11 + ρ12γ12)[F (y|1, A11)− F (y|1, A0)]
−(γ13 − ρ11γ13 + ρ12γ14)[F (y|1, A12)− F (y|1, A10)]. (B.5)
F1(y| − 1, 1) = F (y|1, A10)− (γ12 + ρ11γ11 − ρ12γ12)[F (y|1, A11)− F (y|1, A0)]
+(γ14 − ρ12γ14 + ρ11γ13)[F (y|1, A12)− F (y|1, A10)]. (B.6)
I have just shown that the potential outcome distributions of Y1 are identified up to 6
scalar parameters. I now write the probability weights λ11(w) and λ
1
2(w) as functions of
those parameters. From there, using the monotonicity condition for cumulative distribution
functions and the condition that probability weights lie between 0 and 1, I partially identify
those 6 parameters.
For y11, y
1
2 ∈ Y, we have[
F (y11|1, w)− F (y11|1, A10)
F (y12|1, w)− F (y12|1, A10)
]
=
[
F1(y
1
1|1, 0)− F1(y11|0, 1) F1(y11| − 1, 1)− F1(y11|0, 1)
F1(y
1
2|1, 0)− F1(y12|0, 1) F1(y12| − 1, 1)− F1(y12|0, 1)
]
∗
[
λ11(w)− ρ11
λ12(w)− ρ12
]
If the matrix
[
F1(y
1
1|1, 0)− F1(y11|0, 1) F1(y11| − 1, 1)− F1(y11|0, 1)
F1(y
1
2|1, 0)− F1(y12|0, 1) F1(y12| − 1, 1)− F1(y12|0, 1)
]
is invertible then we
can solve for λ11(w) and λ
1
2(w). This condition holds if and only Ψ and H are invertible,
where
H ≡
[
F (y11|1, A11)− F (y11|1, A10) F (y12|1, A11)− F (y12|1, A10)
F (y11|1, A12)− F (y12|1, A10) F (y12|1, A12)− F (y12|1, A10)
]
.
By adapting the proof of Proposition 1, we can show that the identified set for the 6
parameters is sharp.
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